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et al.: Freedom of Speech and Press

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
N.Y. CONST. art. , §8:
Every Citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press.
U.S. CON.

amend. I:

Congress shall make no lva... abridging the freedom of
speech.., or of the press ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Shack 1
(decided November 2, 1995)

The issue in this case was whether section 240.30(2) of the
New York Penal Law2 violated the United States 3 and New York
State 4 Constitutions because it impinged upon defendant's
constitutionally protected fights of freedom of expression and due

1. 86 N.Y.2d 529, 658 N.E.2d 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1995).
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(2) (McKinney 1996). This section
provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the
second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another
person, he or she... [miakes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation
ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication ... ." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press...." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth
Amendment states in pertinent part: "No state shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " Id.
4. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section eight provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id. N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. This section states in pertinent part: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id.
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process. 5 The New York Court of Appeals first analyzed the
issue of freedom of speech and determined the statute was not
facially unconstitutional and not overbroad because it does not
limit the right to free speech of the defendant "nor chill the
exercise of free speech rights by others." 6 The court then
examined the due process claim and found the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, not violative of the Due
7
Process Clause.
The defendant in this action, Julian Shack, was living in New
York and had a history of mental illness. 8 The complainant was
his first cousin, Diane Buffalin, a psychologist who resided in
Michigan. 9 Shack had not been in contact with Buffalin for at
least twelve years prior to a telephone conversation initiated by
him in June of 1990.10 In this conversation Shack indicated that
he was contacting Buffalin in order to obtain information
regarding the treatment of his mental illness and his prescribed
medications. 11 Buffalin subsequently agreed to an arrangement
with the defendant whereby he could continue to telephone her
provided he "remained in treatment with his psychiatrist and
continued taking his medication." 12 This arrangement continued
on from June through October with the defendant telephoning
Buffalin approximately twice a week. 13 During this period, she
also met with the defendant in New York and arranged for him to
receive treatment at an anxiety clinic which was affiliated with a
New York City Hospital. 14
Towards the end of October 1990, the defendant told Buffalin
that he had stopped taking his medication. 15 Responding to this,
5. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 532-33, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at
663.
6. Id. at 535-38, 658 N.E.2d at 710-12, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664-66.

7. Id. at 538-39, 658 N.E.2d at 712-13, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67.
8. Id. at 533, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.at 533-34, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
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she requested that he please stop calling her. 16 Shack then
proceeded to tell Buffalin that "if he ever got angry with her, he
could bum down the house of her elderly father (his uncle), who
lived in New York City." 17 He then continued to telephone
Buffalin through November and into December of 1990 and she
continued to request that the phone calls cease until he began
taking his medication again. 18
Toward the end of November, Buffalin notified the defendant
that she was to be undergoing major surgery and requested that
he not disturb her during her two week recovery period. 19 Shack,
however, telephoned her three times on the day of her surgery
and then repeatedly telephoned her on a regular basis
thereafter. 20 Between December 12 and the end of that month, he
placed eighty-eight phone calls to Buffalin, at times phoning her
as many as seven times in one day and leaving threatening
messages on her answering machine. 2 1 Buffalin, finally, wrote
Shack a letter in which she stated that she no longer welcomed
his telephone calls and if they continued she would file a criminal
22
complaint against him.

The calls did not stop and in fact telephone records indicated
that there were 185 calls made from Shack's residence in Queens
County to Buffalin between December 12, 1990 and May 20,
1991.23 He telephoned her and left numerous messages in which
he threatened her if she refused to speak with him. 24 Buffalin
telephoned him once in January to ask him to stop calling her and
also called him at other times to replay tape recordings of his
phone calls in order to show him that she was gathering evidence
against him.25 This did not appear to affect him as he continued
16. Id. at 534, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 534, 658 N.E.2d at 709-10, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663-64.
25. Id. at 534, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
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making these unwanted calls until May of 1991 when Buffalin
filed a criminal complaint against him in New York.2 6 Shack was
subsequently "convicted on one count of aggravated harassment
in the second degree and sentenced to three years of
probation. "27
Shack challenged the constitutionality of Penal Law section

240.30(2) on several grounds; first, as infringing upon his right
to freedom of expression and second, as violating his right to due
process. 28 Shack alleged that Penal Law section 240.30(2) is
violative of his right to freedom of expression as provided under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution
and article I, section 8 of the New York Constitution because it is
facially unconstitutional. 29 The court first addressed the freedom
of expression claim.
The court found that Penal Law section 240.30(2) is not
facially unconstitutional because it contains specific limiting
language. 30 The court found that this statute differs from those
that have "impose[d] criminal liability for 'pure speech'. . . or
expressive conduct.' 3 1 The court concluded that the statute
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 535-38, 658 N.E.2d at 710-12, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664-66. The
court, in deciding the scope of this analysis, stated: "Defendant does not
contend that the Free Speech or Due Process Clauses of the New York State
Constitution afford greater protection than those of the Federal Constitution.
Accordingly, our analysis assumes the requirements of both documents are the
same." Id. at 535 n.1, 658 N.E.2d at 710 n.1, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664 n.1.
29. Id. at 535, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
405-06 (1974) (stating that a Washington statute prohibiting the "exhibition of
a United States flag to which is attached or superimposed figures, symbols, or
other extraneous material" constituted an unconstitutional burden on the right
to free speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971). In Cohen,
the Court was asked to determine the legality of a statute prohibiting
"offensive conduct." Id. at 16. The Court examined the statute while
considering a case where an individual was prosecuted for wearing a jacket
expressing an offensive phrase, "Fuck the Draft," and held that the statute was
overbroad because it served to "punish... the fact of communication." Id. at
18. See also Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 4-6 (4th Cir.) (finding a statute
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"proscribes only conduct and expressly removes from its
application 'legitimate communication .... '"32 Therefore,
Shack's claim that the statute is facially unconstitutional because
it violates the First Amendment and article I, section 8 of the
33
State Constitution failed.
Next, the court addressed Shack's claim that the statute was
overbroad. The court stated that even if the statute was found to
limit the exercise of free speech, this alone would not
automatically cause the court to find the statute to be
overbroad. 34 The court specifically stated that:
Constitutional free speech protections "have never been thought
to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever
or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any
circumstances that he chooses;" a person's right to free
expression may be curtailed "upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner."35

The right of a person to exercise his freedom of speech must be
balanced against the listener's right 'to be let alone' in those

places where the latter has a right to privacy 36 or "where it is
impracticable for an unwilling listener to avoid exposure to the
prohibiting expressive conduct over the telephone to be facially overbroad),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 50, 549
N.E.2d 1166, 1167, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (1989) (stating that a statute
prohibiting "the use of 'abusive' language with the intent to 'harass' or 'annoy'
another person" is too limiting of constitutionally protected speech under both
the New York State and Federal Constitutions); People v. Hollman, 68 N.Y.2d
202, 204, 500 N.E.2d 297, 298-99, 507 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (1986) (holding
that defendant's arrest for nude sunbathing is not a violation of his
constitutional right to freedom of expression).
32. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 535, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 535, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (quoting Cohen,
403 U.S. at 19, 21).
36. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
The Court in Rowan determined that a statute "under which a person may
require that a mailer remove his name from its mailing lists and stop all future
mailings to the householder" is constitutional. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729, 731,
740.
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objectionable communication." 37 Furthermore, the Shack court
noted that "[u]nder some circumstances the privacy right may
'plainly outweigh' the free speech rights of an intruder." 38
The court examined the instant case in light of the Rowan
decision. 39 Specifically, the court found that the Rowan analysis
is also applicable to Penal Law section 240.30(2).40 In Rowan,
the court found that "a mailer's right to communicate must stop
at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee" because to find
otherwise would in fact result in the court permitting a trespass
upon an unwilling recipient. 4 1 The court analogized this situation
with that of a person's telephone. 42 A person has a right to a
substantial privacy interest in their telephone as it is considered
the "functional equivalent of the mailbox." 43 Thus, the court in

the current case determined that Penal Law section 240.30(2)
permissibly subordinates a person's right to free speech to a
recipient's right to be free from unwanted telephone calls. 44 The
court further held that the statute is narrowly tailored and because
its purpose is to protect citizens against persons using the
37. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 636, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664
(citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974)). In
Lehman, the Court noted that in an examination of the right to freedom of
speech, "the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have
remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the
Amendment to the speech in question." Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-03 (citation
omitted).
38. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 836, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664
(citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748 (1978)). In the PacificaFoundation case, popularly known as the "Seven
Dirty Words" case, the Court made the point that an individual's right to
privacy in his or her own home is paramount to that of an intruder using the
airwaves to deliver "offensive" messages to the home. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. at 748.
39. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 636, 658 N.E.2d at 710-11, 634 N.Y.S.2d at
664-65.
40. Id. at 636, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
41. Id at 636, 658 N.E.2d at 710-11, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65 (citing
Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37).
42. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 636, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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telephone for reasons other than communication, it furthers a
compelling state interest .45
The court also examined Shack's assertion that Penal Law

section 240.30(2) was unconstitutional as applied to him. 46 The
record indicates that Shack telephoned Buffalin "with the intent
to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm her and that his calls were

made with no legitimate communicative purpose." 47 In light of
these facts the court found that Shack was engaging in a pattern

of harassment against Buffalin and not engaging in the exercise of
48
any communication that was protected by the constitution.
Shack also asserted that the statute "may impair or chill" the

lawful exercise of free speech by others because it may be
interpreted as limiting the expression of constitutionally protected
50
speech. 4 9 Thus, Shack asserted that the statute is overbroad.

The court, however, determined that in order for the defendant to
have a valid claim he must prove that the statute is "substantially
overbroad. "51 The court stated that because the defendant did not
personally suffer an infringement of his right to free speech he
45. Id. See Gormley v. Director Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d
938, 941 (2d Cir.) (applying the analysis used by the court in United States v.
Lampley to determine the constitutionality of a similar Connecticut telephone
harassment statute), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980). See United States v.
Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978). In examining a similar statute,
the federal telephone harassment statute, the court found that "[n]ot all speech
enjoys the protection of the first amendment." Id. The court further stated that
"Congress had a compelling interest in the protection of innocent individuals
from fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the
telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives." Id.
46. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 636, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
47. Id. at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665. See People v.
Smith, 89 Misc. 2d 789, 790, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969-70 (2d Dep't) (finding
no legitimate communicative purpose in a case where the defendant repeatedly
dialed the White Plains Police Department's telephone number twenty-seven
times during a period of three hours and twenty minutes regarding a civil
matter), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
48. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
49. Id. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972)
(stating that a person may have standing to challenge an overbroad statute even
if it is not overbroad as applied to him).
50. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
51. Id.
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may only challenge the constitutionality of the statute if he can
show that it "is so broadly worded that it may reach a substantial

52
amount of constitutionally protected expression."
In examining this issue, the court determined that a distinction
exists between Penal Law section 240.30(2) and other telephone
harassment statutes which in the past have been found to be
constitutionally overbroad. 53 The court stated that the language
contained within the statute limiting its application to those
telephone calls made "with no purpose of legitimate
communication" is sufficient to limit the possibility of it being
considered overbroad. 54 The court further stated that even if they
were to consider the possibility that on rare occasions the statute
could constitutionally restrict protected speech, they would still

be unable to conclude that this overbreadth

would be

52. Id. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1987) (noting that in
examining a criminal statute for overbreadth, particular care must be used
because "those that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate
application"); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (stating that
a statute must be substantially overbroad in order to be held facially invalid);
People v. Hollman, 68 N.Y.2d 202, 208-09, 500 N.E.2d 297, 301-02, 507
N.Y.S.2d 977, 981-82 (1986) (holding that a defendant may challenge a statute
for overbreadth, in the interest of others, provided the "unconstitutional reach
[of the statute] is substantial and the statute is incapable of a reasonable
limiting construction").
53. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 611, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
See Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 (4th Cir.) (finding "[n]early every
operative word" of a Virginia telephone harassment statute to be overly
broad), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Radford v. Webb, 446 F. Supp.
608, 611 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (stating that a telephone statute is overbroad
because it "makes no distinction between language which is abusive but merely
hyperbolic and that which can be construed as expressing an actual intention of
inflicting injury"), aff'd, 596 F.2d 1205 (1979). See also People v. Klick, 362
N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 1977) (holding that an Illinois telephone harassment
statute is overly broad because it is not limited to any specific type of conduct
and "makes criminal [such] conduct [that is] protected by the first
amendment[,J" including the right to communicate to another in a reasonable
manner).
54. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
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substantial. 55 Therefore, the court concluded that "Penal Law §
240.30(2) is not overbroad because it does not infringe upon
protected rights of defendant nor chill the exercise of free speech
56
rights by others."
Another constitutional issue raised by Shack was whether the
statute violated due process. 57 Shack asserted that "the statute is
unconstitutionally vague, i.e., that it violates the constitutional
right to due process because it fails to give a citizen adequate
notice of the nature of proscribed conduct, and permits arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement." 58 The term which Shack
argued was vague and indefinable was the word "legitimate" as it
is used in the clause "no purpose of legitimate
communication." 59 In addressing this issue the court determined
that a defendant whose conduct falls within the scope of a
55. Id. See People v. Hollman, 68 N.Y.2d 202, 209, 500 N.E.2d 297,
302, 507 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (1986) (stating that "the requirement that
overbreadth be substantial is properly used to save a statute which may reach
some protected conduct while prohibiting a whole range of easily identifiable
and constitutionally proscribable conduct") (citations omitted).
56. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711-12, 634 N.Y.S.2d at
665-66.
57. Id. at 538, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666. See supra notes
3 and 4.
58. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 538, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (stating that there
is an analogy to be made between the effect of an overbroad statute and a
vague one); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding that
"f[the constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute"). See also People v. Bright,
71 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1358, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69 (1988)
(restating this two-pronged analysis applicable to an assertion of statutory
vagueness); People v. Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 307, 506 N.E.2d 907, 908-09,
514 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (1987) (holding that a vagueness challenge requires a
two-part analysis in that first, it must be "sufficiently definite" and second, it
"must provide explicit standards for those who apply them") (citations
omitted); People v. llardo, 48 N.Y.2d 408, 413, 399 N.E.2d 59, 61-62, 423
N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (1979) (finding the constitutional requisite that a statue not
be vague serves two purposes in that it informs the citizens of their expected
conduct and it also provides a guide for those who will be enforcing the law).
59. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 538, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
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criminal statute "may not assert a due process challenge on the
grounds that the statute may be vague when applied to the
potential conduct of others." 60 Therefore, the court only
addressed the issue of vagueness with regard to the defendant's
61
own conduct.
The court held that the determination of "[w]hether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague is measured by whether it provides
notice to 'a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute."'62 Refining this rule,
however, the court stated that the mere use of imprecise language
within the statute will not render it "fatally vague if that language

'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed

conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.' '"63 In applying these principles, the court concluded
60. Id. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973) (stating that
a claim for vagueness has little relevance where the conduct of the claimant
"falls squarely within the 'hard core' of the statute's proscriptions") (citations
omitted); Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d at 308, 506 N.E.2d at 909, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 199
(1987) (finding that "if the actions of the defendants are plainly within the
ambit of the statute, the court will not strain to imagine marginal situations in
which the application of the statute is not so clear") (citations omitted).
61. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 538, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
62. Id. (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954))
(alteration in original). The Harriss Court reasoned that no one should be
"held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed." 347 U.S. at 617. See also People v. Cruz, 48
N.Y.2d 419, 423-24, 399 N.E.2d 513, 514, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626-27 (1979)
(stating that a "criminal statute must be stated in terms which are reasonably
definite so that a person of ordinary intelligence will know what the law
prohibits or commands") (citations omitted).
63. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 538, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666
(quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)). In Petrillo, the
Court held that the Constitution does not require more than this, and that it
does not impose impossible standards in proving a statute unconstitutionally
vague. Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 8. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 2728 n.10 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957)
(stating that "'the constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is
required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices'")); People v. Illardo, 48 N.Y.2d 408, 414, 399 N.E.2d 59, 62, 423
N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (1979) (indicating that the constitution is "[r]ecognizing
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that the phrase in question "would be understood to mean the
absence of expression of ideas or thoughts other than threats
and/or intimidating or coercive utterances." 64
The court then went further in its analysis of the challenged
clause, stating that despite Shack's claim that it does not provide
adequate notice to citizens of what they may not do, the statute
should be viewed as a whole, and not in isolation. 65 The clause
when read in the context of the entire statute, was found to be
simply one element of a definition setting forth certain proscribed
conduct. 66 The statute specifically applies to anyone making such
telephone calls "with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm
another person." 67 The court concluded that the specific
inclusion by the legislature of the intent element eliminates the
possibility that a defendant could engage in this criminal conduct
68
without specific knowledge of the nature of his acts.
Additionally, the court found that this "intent element also

reality" by not requiring impossible standards and finding that "common
understanding and practices" may even be used to assist in the interpretation of
a statute); City of Albany v. Lee, 53 N.Y.2d 633, 634-35, 420 N.E.2d 974,
974, 438 N.Y.S.2d 782, 782 (1981) (holding that the application of statute
must be measured by a "common understanding and practices," not by
impossible standards) (citations omitted).
64. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 538, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
65. Id. at 538-39, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666 (quotation
omitted).
68. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (holding that
the addition of an intent element to a statute can sometimes render an
otherwise vague statute valid); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787
(1978) (finding that the inclusion of a specific intent element in a statute may
avoid a claim of constitutional vagueness); People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376,
383-84, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1359, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70 (1988). In Bright, the
court determined that a statute which prohibited loitering was
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to distinguish between harmful and
innocent conduct and, therefore, failed to inform the citizens of what action is
expected of them. Id. In addition the statute also failed because it did not limit
the discretion of those capable of enforcing it. Id.
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removes the possibility that criminal liability would be imposed
69
based on the unascertainable sensitivities of the victim."
The court also determined that there is no possibility of
arbitrary enforcement of the statute by police officers, judges and
juries. 70 First, the statute itself contains a clear and
understandable description of the elements and standards defining
the appropriate criminal conduct. 7 1 Second, because of the nature
of the acts covered under the statute, enforcement of the statute is
unlikely unless the victim files a complaint with the authorities.72
The court, therefore, concluded that Penal Law section 240.30(2)
sufficiently "describes an element of the proscribed conduct, and
provides sufficient notice to potential offenders and sufficient
guidelines to those who would enforce the statute and that
defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of validity
73
which attaches to legislative enactments.-

As noted, 74 the Shack court did not attempt to apply an

75
expansive interpretation of the New York Constitution.
However, the cases cited in this purview make it somewhat clear
that an expansive interpretation of the New York Constitution in
this case would be unprecedented. On virtually every issue raised
by Shack, the New York and federal decisions appear consistent.
Nevertheless, the Shack court makes the point that the New York

69. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613 (1971) (stating that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague if it does "not indicate upon whose sensitivity a
violation does depend-the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the
arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man").
70. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 712-13, 634 N.Y.S.2d at
666-67.
71. Id. at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 713, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
72. Id.
73. Id. People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1358,
526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69 (1988) (stating that a legislative act is "presumed to be
valid and the heavy burden of demonstrating that a statute is unconstitutional
rests with the one seeking to invalidate the statute").
74. See supra note 28.
75. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 535 n.1, 658 N.E.2d at 710 n.1, 634 N.Y.S.2d at
664 n. 1 (stating that the court will assume the New York State Constitution is
no broader than the Federal Constitution in this case because the defendant did
not raise the issue).
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Constitution goes no further than the constitutional minimum
provided under federal precedent.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
76
Jay-Jay Cabaret, Inc. v. State
(decided April 4, 1995)

Plaintiff, Jay-Jay Cabaret, Inc., brought this action seeking a

declaratory judgment that one of the rules promulgated by the
New York State Liquor Authority (hereinafter "SLA") was
unconstitutional either on its face or as it was being applied to the

plaintiff.77 Plaintiff contend[ed] that the "six-foot" provision of
SLA Rule 36.1(s) 7 8 "violate[d] the freedom of expression of
dancers employed by plaintiff" 7 9 and was, therefore, violative of
81
both the United States 8 0 and the New York State Constitutions.
76. 164 Misc. 2d 673, 629 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1st Dep't 1995).
77. Id. at 675, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939. Plaintiff also raised another claim in
its original complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that Alcoholic Beverage
Law section 106(6) was unconstitutional, or in the alternative, a declaration
that "table dancing" did "not constitute a 'disorderly' condition" for the
purposes of section 106(6). Id. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that the use
of "liquid latex bras" did not violate SLA Rule 36.1(s). Id. In its proposed
amended complaint, plaintiff raised two additional theories: 1) "that Rule
36. l(s) was promulgated by the SLA without... or in excess of its authorized
power," and 2) "that Rule 36.1(s) violated Article HI, [section] 1 of the New
York State Constitution." Id. at 676, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 939. The court granted
plaintiff's motion to amend. Id. at 676, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
78. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 53.1(s) (McKinney
1987). The "six-foot" provision provides that topless performers must be on a
platform eighteen inches above the floor level or higher and no less than six
feet from the nearest patron. Id.
79. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 680, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
80. U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law ...abridging the freedom of spech... ." Id.
81. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"[No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech...."
Id.
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